Subject: McGrath - Two Powers and Early Christology
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Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2005 23:10:08 +1000

‘TWO POWERS’ AND EARLY JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN MONOTHEISM

James McGrath (Alliance Theological Seminary)

with Jerry Truex (Tabor College)

Our understanding of early Judaism and its relationship to
Christianity has been significantly advanced by Alan Segal’s formative
work on the two powers heresy.[1]
This work demonstrated that belief in two heavenly powers was considered
an intolerable heresy by the rabbis[2]
and that Christians were among those indicted.[3]
Furthermore, Segal argued that the two powers debate could be traced back
to the first century, as evidenced by certain christological passages of
the NT[4]
and by Philo's writings.[5]
Thus, according to Segal, the two powers controversy provides an important
insight into the first-century context of the NT and, conversely, these
early Jewish and Christian writings shaped rabbinic reports about those
who claim “there are two powers in heaven.”

Segal's study has widely influenced Jewish and Christian scholarship.[6]
Among its contributions, the study firmly placed early christological
development and controversy in a Jewish setting. It also took a
critical approach to the dating and redaction of rabbinic literature.
However, Segal’s study is not without shortcomings. For example, Segal
appears to maintain that there was a clear ‘orthodoxy’ in first-century
Judaism,[7]
whereas the existence of a clearly recognizable ‘orthodoxy’ during this
period is much debated.[8]

Segal hints at three possible ways of relating the ‘two powers’ debate to
first-century Judaism. First, we have the interpretation which Segal
himself appears to favour, stressing continuity or consistent
condemnation.[9]
On this interpretation of the evidence, the belief that there were ‘two
powers in heaven’ was condemned as a heresy in rabbinic literature just as
the same belief was condemned as a heresy in first-century Judaism. This
view maintains that there was continuity in belief (it was the same belief
over the centuries) and continuity in rabbinic condemnation (it was not
accepted at any time). A second possible way of conceptualizing the matter
can be called retrospective condemnation. That is, certain
first-century Jewish beliefs were later classified as ‘two powers heresy’
and retrospectively condemned in rabbinic literature.[10]
Here we have continuity in belief (the same belief), but not in
condemnation (earlier the belief in question was accepted (or at the very
least tolerated), but later it was not). A third explanation emphasizes
development: Particular first-century Jewish beliefs evolved into a
form which became intolerable for the rabbis.[11]
In this view, there is only partial continuity of belief (it changed over
time), and there is discontinuity regarding condemnation (only the later
form was rejected).

Segal’s study has demonstrated that a similarity exists between some
first-century exegesis (like Philo's) and later ‘two powers’ discussions
in the rabbinic literature. However, he has not provided corroborating
evidence for his overall conclusion in two ways. First, Segal has not
provided evidence that Philo, for example, was regarded by his Jewish
contemporaries as a heretic, which Segal’s work might lead us to expect.
This suggests that a retrospective explanation may be possible.
Second, Segal has not demonstrated that specific first-century beliefs
were identical with those later condemned. This opens the way for a
developmental explanation. Thus, we believe there are grounds for
questioning whether or not christological passages in the NT ought to be
read in light of the ‘two powers heresy’ of rabbinic Judaism. Although
various forms of ‘two powers’ conceptuality may have been present in
first-century Christian and Jewish thought, we will argue that there is no
evidence that they were identified as heretical during that century.

II.
Methodology and Dating

The
last couple of decades of study of rabbinic literature can almost be
described as a revolution, as critical methodology, developed in the field
of NT studies and other scholarly disciplines, has been applied to the
relevant source material. Thus recent critical studies have eclipsed
earlier rabbinic scholarship, which often took materials separated by many
centuries to form a monolithic entity called ‘Judaism’.[12]
However, the fact that this revolution has taken place so recently means
that there is still uncertainty in many areas, particularly with respect
to the dating of documents. On questions of dating rabbinic material, NT
scholars can for the most part do little more than accept the results
reached by scholars in the field of rabbinic studies, and where necessary
note differences of opinion. Perhaps even more important for our purposes,
however, is the question of the relationship between (1) the date assigned
to a particular rabbinic document and (2) the date of the rabbis who
appear in that work. It has long been axiomatic in NT scholarship that
written documents tell us about the Sitz im Leben of the authors
and only secondarily--and through critical study--about any earlier period
described in those works. This axiom, increasingly recognized and accepted
by scholars engaged in academic study of the rabbinic literature, informs
our approach. So, for example, later documents which attribute to earlier
rabbis views which are nowhere attested in earlier writings must be
treated with some degree of skepticism.[13]

Although we have no desire to exclude potentially valuable information
from any quarter, this study limits itself to Jewish literature through
ca. 600 C.E. when the Babylonian Talmud reached closure.[14]
While it is not impossible that later documents can tell us something
about first-century Jewish-Christian relations, in any other discipline
the use of documents dating from centuries after the time being studied
would be considered methodologically suspect. This should be true of
rabbinic studies as well.[15]
Although our study has as its primary aim to illuminate
first-century Jewish-Christian theology in relation to two powers
belief, we shall nonetheless investigate later traditions to determine
what, if anything, can be traced to the first century.

III. The Start of
the Controversy

A. Philo and the
NT

Let us
begin with the earliest evidence available to us, namely the writings of
Philo and the NT. What is immediately striking is that there is no real
indication in the writings of Philo and Paul that they felt their beliefs,
which resemble the ‘two powers’ belief in rabbinic literature, were
controversial. In dealing with Philo, Segal persuasively argues that Philo
and the rabbis drew upon common traditions regarding the powers, names,
and attributes of God. However, in contrast to the rabbis, Philo's
identification of the Logos as ‘a second God’ and even ‘God,’ and his
association of the Logos with the ‘two powers’[16]
of God, is conspicuously positive.[17]
It is also surely significant that Philo nowhere seeks to defend these
beliefs against a charge of heresy.[18]The
fact that Philo gives no indication that he was departing from an
already-existing Jewish ‘orthodoxy,’ or that his teaching on the Logos was
met with objections, suggests that his views were not objectionable to his
contemporaries. Although this is admittedly a form of argument from
silence, it is not without force, since research into the sociology of
knowledge indicates that when objections are raised against one's belief
system, that belief system or worldview must be defended or legitimated.[19]

The same may be said in relation to Paul. While Paul engages in a great
deal of legitimation for his view of Torah, there is no indication that he
felt the need to defend himself against charges of ‘two powers’ heresy.[20]
Paul's view of the exalted Christ's investiture with the divine name
(Phil.2:9-11) must be viewed in relation to non-Christian Jewish texts
such as the Apocalypse of Abraham. This work refers to an exalted
angel, Yahoel, who bears the divine name (Apoc.Abr.10:3,8). There
is simply no evidence that belief in a supreme mediator or agent of God,
one that might later be called a ‘second power,’ was controversial at any
point during the first century CE. This is not to be explained by the lack
of any universally recognized authority which could speak for Jewish
‘orthodoxy’ in this period. Even within the context of first century
Jewish diversity, parties in conflict with one another took seriously the
objections of their opponents and sought to respond to them.[21]
In the case of Paul's claims about the exalted Christ and of Philo's view
of the Logos as a second god, there is nothing to indicate that
their contemporaries found them to be heretical or controversial.[22]

The key witness usually appealed to as evidence for the existence of the
‘two powers heresy’ in the first century is the Gospel of John,[23]
and many NT scholars would agree that the Johannine Christians had been
accused of abandoning monotheism.[24]
While it cannot be denied that John bears witness to an intense conflict
regarding christology, this need not imply that it centred on monotheism
per se. What is telling is that within the Gospel of John the
opponents of the Johannine Christians do not use the phrase ‘two powers’
nor do they charge Jesus or the Johannine Christians with rejecting
monotheism. There are only two clear references to monotheism in the
Fourth Gospel and both affirm the oneness of God in rather axiomatic
language, without defense or explanation (John 5:44; 17:3). If the
Johannine Christians had been charged with rejecting monotheism, we would
expect the writer to make a more vigorous and explicit defense. But it
does not happen.

Rather, the controversies narrated in the Fourth Gospel are being fought
on different theological ground. The conflict centres on the question of
who is God's agent, who has God sent.[25]
If Jesus is God's agent, then he speaks and acts on God's behalf (John
5:17-30). If he is not, he is demon possessed (John 7:20; 8:52), a
deceiver (John 7:47), and a blasphemer (John 10:33). It is with these
issues that the author appears to have been concerned, and his response is
overwhelmingly clear. Fifteen times the Johannine Jesus is said to have
been sent by God; twenty-three times Jesus refers to the Father as “the
one who sent me”; seven times Jesus is said to be “from” God.[26]
For the Johannine believer, the work of God is “to believe in the one whom
he has sent” (John 6:29). But there is more to the Johannine claim for
Jesus’ divine agency. For John, Jesus functions, in practical terms, as
equivalent to God, in accordance with the basic principle of agency
that “the one sent is like the one who sent him.”[27]
Jesus does whatever the Father does (John 5:19), he gives life just as the
Father does (John 5:21), he receives equal honor to the Father (John
5:23), his teaching is God’s teaching (John 7:16), to see him is to see
God (John 14:9), he and the Father are one (John 10:30). The issue central
to the conflict is whether Jesus "makes himself equal to God",
rather than being God's appointed agent. The Johannine Jesus avidly denies
that he is making himself anything; rather, he does the will of him who
sent him.[28]

Thus, notwithstanding John’s strong language of continuity between the
agent and the sender, John’s presentation of Jesus fits well within the
broad understanding of monotheism current within first-century Judaism.29]
The language used to describe the divine agency of the Johannine Jesus has
close parallels in contemporary Jewish and Christian writings, works which
are generally accepted as monotheistic. For example, it is widely
recognized that John’s concept of the Logos has similarities with
Philo’s.[30]
As previously mentioned, Philo described the Logos as a ‘second God,’ and
yet Philo did not feel that this undercut belief that God is one.[31]
Likewise John’s view of Jesus as one who bears the divine name (John 8:24,
28, 58; 17:11) has parallels both in Jewish and in pre-Johannine Christian
thought.[32]
The accusations of ‘blasphemy’ and of Jesus ‘making himself (equal to)
God’ in John closely resemble the Synoptic tradition found in Mark 2:5-7.
In Mark, some objected to Jesus claiming to do what God does, either
because they felt this was something which God would not delegate to an
agent, or because they did not accept that Jesus is God’s appointed agent.
John seems to develop these ideas, but there is nothing that indicates
that John had taken “a step too far.”[33]
Rather, in John we have evidence of increased controversy over the same
issues that were sticking points between Christian and non-Christian Jews
from the very beginning. As we have already seen, there is no evidence
of conflict over monotheism prior to John; we may now suggest that John
more closely resembles the earlier conflicts depicted in the Synoptics
than the later rabbinic ‘two powers’ material.

Before proceeding, we may note two further points about the rabbinic
discussions of ‘two powers’ in relation to the first-century. First, it is
interesting that there are no references within rabbinic literature
linking ‘two powers’ with any of the first century tannaim. Second, the
Babylonian Talmud and 3 Enoch in their present form date the origin of the
two powers controversy to the early second century. Although we shall see
that there are reasons to question the historical reliability of this
tradition, it is noteworthy that no attempt was made by the tannaim to
link the ‘two powers’ controversy to events or persons of the
first-century, in the time of Jesus, Philo, Paul, and John.

B. Justin
Martyr

An
extremely important witness to early Jewish-Christian dialogue is Justin
Martyr. His Dialogue with Trypho the Jew was written around 160
C.E., although it purports to record a dialogue which he had around 135
C.E.[34]
Whether a fictitious dialogue or not, what is important is that Justin
seems to be concerned about interacting with the actual views and
positions held by contemporary Jews. It is significant, therefore, that
one of Justin's Jewish interlocutors agrees with Justin that there is be a
second figure in heaven alongside God, who is also called God and
Lord.[35]
Trypho is portrayed as quite quickly reaching the same conclusion.[36]
Thus, in this second century work, there is no hint that the belief in a
‘second god,’ a heavenly agent and vice-regent, is heretical or
antithetical to Jewish monotheism. When Segal refers to Justin's
interlocutor as a “heterodox Jew,” he is assuming what needs to be
proved.[37]
The question of when a Judaism that may rightly be called ‘orthodox’
finally emerged is currently the subject of much discussion and debate.
Many would want to emphasize that, in spite of whatever impressions
rabbinic literature may give, it was only a long and slow process that
eventually led to the rabbinic definition of Judaism being accepted as
‘normative’ in some sense.[38]

C.
Mishnah and Tosefta

We may
now turn to those passages in the Mishnah and Tosefta that are thought to
contain allusions to ‘two powers’. It is noteworthy that the phrase itself
never appears, a fact which is given more significance when one considers
that the Tosefta contains several references to Christians as minim
(‘heretics’).[39]
The lack of explicit reference to ‘two powers’ cannot be explained as a
lack of interest in Christianity, since the rabbis who composed the
Tosefta took the trouble to polemicize against Christians. So, if
Christian belief in ‘two powers in heaven’ was an issue at that time, it
is quite surprising that the Mishnah and the Tosefta do not mention
it.

Nevertheless, that are several passages from the Mishnah and the Tosefta
which Segal takes to allude to the ‘two powers’ heresy, and these must be
examined. The first passage refers to certain heretics who say there are
‘many ruling powers in heaven.’

M.
Sanh. 4:5: “Therefore but a single man was created in the world ...
that none should say to his fellow, ‘My father was greater than your
father;’ also that the heretics should not say, ‘There are many ruling
powers in heaven’”

The
phrase used in this Mishnaic passage is not ‘two powers’ but ‘many
powers’, which suggests a distinct set of beliefs.[40]
While this brief pericope leaves a number of questions unanswered, its
meaning appears to be clear enough: If numerous human beings had been
created, people might have concluded that this was evidence of several
creators. The phrase ‘many powers’ sounds suspiciously like polytheism,
and it may be that there were Jews (pagans cannot be in mind because
of  the use of minim) who believed that it was not God but the
angels who created the world. Justin Martyr refers to Jews who hold such
beliefs, and he calls it “heresy.”[41]
The evidence from Justin suggests that one could reject creation by angels
and yet believe in the Logos (or a similar supreme mediator or personified
divine attribute). It is the former sort of belief which the rabbis appear
to refer to as ‘many powers,’ whereas it is the latter which
eventually developed into or came to be regarded as heretical belief in
‘two powers.’ The two are not entirely unrelated, but neither are
they simply to be identified.

The conclusion that lesser beings created the world was a key element in
certain streams of Hellenistic Judaism and in Gnosticism, both of which
were influenced by contemporary Platonism. These various groups all
posited, in one form or another, a demiurge, distinct from the high God,
who created the (evil) world, often with helpers.[42]
The Mishnah’s argument makes sense as a response to such views. It argues
from the Biblical account that only one human being was created to be the
origin of all human kind, which in turn implies that there was one
creator, not many.[43]
This is similar to the argument that, just as there is one temple and one
nation chosen by God, so also there is only one true God. [44]
Therefore, m. Sanh. 4:5 does not appear to identify the sort of
Logos doctrine held by Philo and the early Christians as heretical; it is
more likely aimed at beliefs which were moving in a gnostic direction.[45]
Beliefs of this sort were an issue for Christians in the second century
and may well have been for Jews as well.[46]
Although we are probably dealing with something distinct from ‘two powers’
in this passage, it is quite possible that this early use of ‘powers’
language provided the basis for the use of ‘two powers’ beliefs later on.
If so, the designation ‘two powers’ may have been used to stigmatize those
who held such beliefs as little better than those who had polytheistic or
gnostic leanings.

Next we may look at three passages from the Mishnah also thought to refer
to the ‘two powers’ heresy. These warnings focus on what is acceptable and
unacceptable prayer.

M.
Ber. 5:3: “He who says [in a prayer]: ‘Even to a bird's nest do your
mercies extend’ or ‘May your name be remembered for the good’ or ‘We give
thanks, we give thanks’--is to be silenced”

M.
Meg. 4:9: "He who says "May the good bless you" - this is the manner
of sectarianism"

M.
Ber. 9:5: "Man is bound to bless (God) for the evil even as he blesses
(God) for the good"

The
meaning of the first prayer concerning ‘a bird's nest’ is obscure, as it
was to the amoraic rabbis who discuss it in b. Ber. 33b and b.
Meg. 25a.[47]
The latter two prayers are associated with ‘two powers’ in the Babylonian
Talmud, but this may very well represent an attempt either to understand
an obscure decision by earlier rabbis, or to make an earlier decision
relevant to the issues of their day. As it stands, the prayers which thank
God for the good but not for the evil appear to imply an opposing dualism
or Gnosticism: such prayers suggest that God is to be thanked for the
good, but another power is to be blamed for the evil. The opponents in
mind here are unlikely to be either early Christians or Jews with
beliefs similar to those of Philo.

In the first prayer, we also find the repetition of  ‘We give
thanks.’ This is easy to associate with ‘two powers’ since it was the
repetition of the name of God in the Hebrew Scriptures that ‘two powers
heretics’ often appealed to in support of their beliefs.[48]
However, as Segal himself acknowledges, “The amoraic traditions concerning
the prayer do not clarify the heresy. Although they assume that such
prayers are to be silenced because they manifest ‘two powers in heaven,’
they do not explain how. We may suspect that they themselves were
guessing. We must also be prepared to allow that the tannaim in their day
were worried by different phenomenon [sic.] from the amoraim.”[49]

In addition, Segal notes that the repetition of the words in the synagogue
liturgy is unlikely to have been the real problem, since the rabbis came
to require a repetition. He suggests that it may be the eucharistic
prayers of Christians which are in view, since the Didache includes a
double thanksgiving as part of the eucharistic service (Did 9:2-3).[50]
This is highly speculative, but even if it is correct, there is no
indication that the problem was prayer which mentioned a second power. The
Didache has only prayer to the Father giving thanks for Jesus. The glory
clearly goes to the one God for Jesus, without hint of ‘two powers.’
Alternatively, Gruenwald suggests that the problem may have been adding
one’s own prayer alongside those which were part of the official liturgy.
Introducing a personally-composed prayer with the same language as
official liturgy (modim, ‘we give thanks’) would be in danger of
claiming official status.[51]
In view of this uncertainty about what was being objected to in m.
Ber 5:3, it seems prudent not to assume that the repetition of ‘We
give thanks’ is a reference to ‘two powers’ unless further evidence is
forthcoming.

Finally, we turn to a passage from the Tosefta, probably composed in the
decades immediately after the completion of the Mishnah. Here a reference
is made to minim who believe, or who might reach the conclusion,
that God had a partner in creation, specifically Adam.[52]

T.
Sanh. 8:7: Our rabbis taught: Adam was created on the eve of the
Sabbath. And why? So that the heretics could not say: The Holy One,
blessed be He, had a partner in his work (of creation).

We
know from a number of Jewish sources that, in some circles at least, Adam
was believed to have been created as a great and glorious being. Philo
even distinguished between a heavenly and earthly Adam, but it is unlikely
that his sort of exegesis is the object of this polemic. Philo interpreted
Genesis 1 as the creation of heavenly things, and thus for him the
heavenly Adam, identified with the Logos, did in fact have a role in the
creation of the earthly realm. Yet t. Sanh. 8:7 does not seem to
address or to be relevant to the issues raised by this type of
interpretation of Genesis 1.[53]

The saying is perhaps best interpreted as a response to the traditions
which glorify Adam and almost turn him into a divine being. However, the
polemic is not against the idea that Adam was created as a splendorous
being per se, but against the idea that he was God’s partner in
creation. Thus the rabbis were placing a limit on the exalted status of
Adam in order to check unbridled speculation: Adam, however glorious and
exalted, did not create. It must also be pointed out that there is nothing
which clearly indicates that any group actually held the views described
here. It is possible that the rabbis are hypothetically addressing
what heretics might have said if Adam had not been created on the
sixth day. Nevertheless, if the t. Sanh. 8:7 tradition is
related to the issue of ‘two powers’--and this is far from clear--then it
is, at best, one of the first indicators that ‘two powers’ belief  is
becoming problematic. Thus even if, for the sake of argument, we grant
that t. Sanh. 8:7 is related to the ‘two powers’ controversy, this
does not provide grounds for dating the controversy earlier than
immediately prior to the composition of the Tosefta around the beginning
of the third century CE.

D. Babylonian
Talmud

Since
the Mishnah and Tosefta show no clear signs of the ‘two powers’
controversy, it is likely that the controversy only arose after the
formation of these documents. Nonetheless, later rabbinic writings trace
the origins of the ‘two powers’ controversy to the early second century
CE. We will therefore discuss two key baraitot from the Babylonian
Talmud which are connected with key rabbis from this period. The first
passage reads as follows:

b.
Hag. 14a. One passage says: His throne was fiery flames (Dan
7:9) and another passage says: Until thrones were placed; and One that
was ancient of days did sit--there is no contradiction; One (throne)
for Him and one for David: this is the view of R. Akiba. Said R. Yosi the
Galilean to him: Akiba, how long will you profane the Shekinah? Rather,
one for justice and one for mercy. Did he accept (this explanation) from
him, or did he not accept it? -- Come and hear: One for justice and one
for mercy; this is the view of R. Akiba.

Segal recognizes that
“no one would suggest that these are Akiba's actual words.” He also
acknowledges that, even if Akiba did hold to beliefs such as those
represented here, the portrait of him recanting his earlier view may well
be an attempt to bring him into line with later ‘orthodoxy.’[54]
Thus, even if Akiba maintained some form of belief in ‘two powers,’ this
would still would not demonstrate that his belief would have been regarded
as objectionable in his time. Further, it is not entirely clear
that this baraita, if it does represent an authentic tradition
about Akiba, was originally about ‘two powers.’ In its present position
within the Babylonian Talmud, this story is situated in the context of a
discussion of subjects related to ‘two powers.’ However, if the dialogue
between R. Akiba and R. Yosi is taken on its own, the issue may simply be
whether any human figure--even a unique human figure like the Messiah--is
worthy to sit alongside God in heaven.[55]
Such a discussion presupposes belief in the uniqueness of God, but does
not necessarily deny or challenge it.

One should compare this baraita with the tradition concerning the
trial of Jesus before the Sanhedrin recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, in
which the high priest is depicted as condemning Jesus to death for
‘blasphemy,’ because he asserted that they will see the Son of Man (with
whom he implicitly identifies himself) seated at God's right hand. Here
too there is no reason to think that Jesus was being accused of abandoning
monotheism.[56]
Rather, he was felt to have claimed for himself  a status which was
too high for a human being, especially one who was rejected by the leaders
and condemned to death.[57]
Akiba was remembered for having identified Bar Kochba as the Messiah, and
this may have been part of the difficulty in the rabbinic passage: to have
made messianic claims for someone who was put to death by the Romans may
have been what was really the sticking point.[58]
On the other hand, to make extravagant claims for any human being in the
present day may have met with resistance. There is probably a
psychological aspect to this issue which is worthy of further
investigation. It seems to be the case that people are often willing to
make assertions concerning 'canonical' heroes and figures which they would
be unwilling to make or accept concerning any one of their contemporaries.
At any rate, the most we can say with certainty is that to make grandiose
claims for a failed messiah was felt to be ‘blasphemy’ or ‘profaning the
Shekinah’ in the sense of ‘insulting to God.’[59]
There is nothing which necessitates the conclusion that this tradition was
originally connected with the issue of ‘two powers’ heresy.[60]

The second passage from the Babylonian Talmud is the most famous ‘two
powers’ tradition. It concerns the apostasy of R. Elisha ben Abuya, often
referred to as ‘Aher’ (meaning ‘other’) in rabbinic tradition. The story
is preserved in b. Hag. 15a and also (in a different form)
in 3 Enoch 16. Regarding b. Hag. 15a, Segal acknowledges
that “The tradition is a late addition to the Babylonian Talmud.”[61]
This means that we are dealing with a gap of more than three centuries
between the time Aher lived and the writing of this story in the Talmud.
The authenticity of the tradicition is thus at best questionable, and is
certainly not to be taken for granted. In a similar vein, P. Alexander
writes, in reference to the attribution of 3 Enoch to R. Ishmael (d. 132
C.E.), that “there can be no question of accepting this attribution at
face value; the work is a pseudepigraphon and Ishmael is simply the
authority the author or redactor of 3 Enoch wished to claim.”[62]
He dates 3 Enoch to the 5th-6th century C.E., while acknowledging that a
later date is not impossible.[63]
In addition, chapter 16, which contains the tradition concerning Aher’s
apostasy, shows signs of being an interpolation into 3 Enoch and so can be
dated even later.[64]

The lack of any mention of ‘two powers’ in the Mishnah is thus highlighted
by the fact that this important rabbi-turned-heretic is not associated
with this heresy until hundreds of years after his apostasy is said to
have taken place. The connection between Aher and the specific heresy of
‘two powers in heaven’ is thus problematic, and we have no way of knowing
how early or late his name first became associated with this particular
controversy. Even if the historical Elisha ben Abuya did hold views which
were later censored, this still does not provide evidence that,
in his own day and age, they would have been regarded as
unacceptable. It would therefore be ill-advised to accept this tradition
as evidence of a controversy which involved these near-contemporaries of
the NT authors. The story is explicable in terms of the tendency to
attribute later heresies to earlier figures who were already regarded as
heretics, and to attribute responses to those heresies to earlier,
well-known, authoritative sources. Thus, in Gruenwald’s words, “It is
quite likely that the rabbis found in ’Elish‘a ben ’Avuyah a peg on which
they hung a variety of heretical views.”[65]

The evidence thus gives no support for dating the origins of the
controversy even to the second century. It is of course possible that the
controversy did in fact arise in the second century, but had not yet had
sufficient impact to leave any clear or explicit trace in the traditions
and literature from that period. However, in the absence of clear
evidence, any suggestion that the ‘two powers’ controversy was already
underway in the second century must remain hypothetical.

E. Midrashim

We
find the first explicit reference to ‘two powers’ in the period after the
composition of the Mishnah and Tosefta, in the so-called ‘Tannaitic
Midrashim.’ The earliest reference is probably Sifre Deuteronomy 379,[66]
which seems to have Gnosticism in mind. When the rabbis describe ‘two
powers’ as antagonistic, Gnosticism is indicated; when the ‘two powers’
are complementary, it is something else.[67]
With this distinction in mind, Sifre Deuteronomy 379 seems to be combating
a Gnostic version of ‘two powers’ belief because it argues against the
view that one power is responsible for life and another power for death.[68]
The reference in Mekhilta de-R. Ishmael is also probably aimed at
Gnosticism of some form.[69]
The point which it attributes to R. Nathan (c.135-170)--that when the Holy
One claimed “I am the Lord thy God” no one protested--suggests an
opposition between the two powers, and recalls the Gnostic stories of the
God of the Jews claiming to be the only God when he was in fact ignorant
of the true God.[70]
The earliest use of the term ‘two powers’ thus appears to be as a
reference to Gnosticism. This is exactly the opposite of the conclusion
which is reached by Segal.[71]

F.
The Third Century Context

This
reevaluation of the tradition history of the ‘two powers’ material, and of
the controversies which formed them, may explain the continuity that
exists between the exegesis of the ‘two powers heretics’ and earlier
traditions and views. Scholars have long noted that writers like Philo
share some views in common with Gnosticism, probably because of their
common Platonic heritage rather than through direct influence.[72]
It is likely that other Platonizing Jews were responsible for developing
Gnosticism, and thus they may have been influenced either by Philo’s own
writings or by the Hellenistic Jewish traditions that influenced Philo.
Similarly, Jacob Neusner has noted that, although there is no clear
evidence that the authors of the Mishnah were aware of and interacting
with Gnosticism, they come down firmly on matters which also interested
the Gnostics, but with the opposite conclusions.[73]
The designation ‘two powers’ may thus be a reference to a heresy (and that
there were Jewish Gnostics seems very likely)[74]
with which the rabbis had perhaps already begun to interact in the second
century, without calling it by that specific name.

The third century provides a suitable context for the origin or
intensification of the debate with Gnosticism, and perhaps also with
Christianity. If ‘two powers’ only became an issue in the third century,
then we must attempt to offer some explanation of why this should be the
case. In the second century, we see Christian theologians beginning to
formulate the idea of creatio ex nihilo. This was done by drawing
out the implications of the Judeo-Christian view of God in response to
Gnosticism and contemporary philosophy, both of which held that there was
an eternally existent material which God made use of when he created.[75]
Judaism on the whole did not adopt or develop the doctrine of creatio
ex nihilo until the middle ages.[76]
Nonetheless, the debates about how God relates to creation may have had an
impact on Judaism as well as on Christianity, even if the effect was not
the same. Christians, concerned to emphasize the goodness of creation
against Gnosticism, denied that God used eternally existent matter in
creating, and began to define God in such a way that a clear dividing line
was drawn between God and creation. This line had not previously been
drawn, and the space where the line would be drawn was previously occupied
by the Logos, whom Philo describes as “neither uncreated...nor created.”[77]
From the second century onwards, Christians began to see the need to
distinguish clearly between God and creation, which ultimately
necessitated that a line be drawn on one side or the other of the Logos.
And so it was that Arius and other non-Nicenes drew the line between God
and the Logos, whereas the Nicenes drew the line between the Logos and the
creation.[78]

The rabbis did not confront exactly the same issues as the Christians, and
they seem to have reached different conclusions and to have nuanced their
views differently. If God's uniqueness was safeguarded sufficiently, his
use of pre-existent material need not be problematic. And thus it may be
supposed that the rabbis also participated in this debate, drawing a
different but equally clear line between God and creation, which might be
bridged by metaphorical expressions of God's creative activity, such as
Memra, but which nonetheless remained firm. At this point, in
response to Gnosticism and to Christianity, the oneness of God was defined
in terms of the denial of a ‘second power in heaven’ who functions as, and
could thus be confused with, God. In previous times, the distinguishing
factor between the one God and other gods and angelic beings was worship,
the cultic worship of the temple.[79]
Perhaps it was the final disappearance of any real hope for the rebuilding
of the temple--the place where the worship that distinguished Israel's God
from all other beings and powers took place--that created the need to
define the uniqueness of God in more abstract terms. This is of course
speculation. But in view of the fact that an unambiguous dividing line
between creator and creation appears not to have been drawn--or at least
drawn clearly and explicitly--before the second century, whether by Jews
or pagans, Christians or Gnostics, it makes sense to relate the Jewish
opposition to belief in ‘two powers’ to this particular setting and
controversy. The documentary evidence from rabbinic Judaism and the issues
being debated by many other groups fit well together, and thus makes it
reasonable to date the origins of the ‘two powers’ heresy to the end of
the second century at the very earliest, and more likely to the first half
of the third.

IV. What Exactly Was
Heretical About 'Two Powers'?

Our
study, and much other recent scholarship, suggest that, in first century
Judaism at least, monotheism was felt to be compatible with the idea of a
divine agent or viceroy who represented God and acted on his behalf.[80]
This does not appear to have ceased to be the case even later on. The
Babylonian Talmud recounts a discussion which is said to have taken place
between R. Idi (2nd-3rd cent. C.E.) and a heretic who engages in ‘two
powers’ exegesis, pointing out that Genesis 19:24 appears to refer to two
‘Lords.’[81]
It is R. Idi who responds by asserting that this refers to Metatron, who
bears God's name.[82]
His only point of conflict with the heretic is about whether this figure
should be worshipped. The idea that there was such a principal agent of
God does not appear to have been an issue in and of itself; rather, it was
some specific aspect of the content of that belief that was in
dispute. This suggests what may have led to the ‘two powers’ designation
being applied to Christians. On the one hand, Christians regarded the
Logos/Christ as essentially an 'emanation' from the Father, which may have
seemed rather Gnostic to the rabbis. On the other hand, from the second
century onwards, there was an increasing tendency to worship Christ as
God.[83]
Likewise, the developing Christian understanding of Christ as ‘fully God,’
which was officially affirmed at the Council of Nicaea in 325 C.E., led
some to believe that monotheism was being denied.[84]
It is interesting to note that, even in the post-Nicaea period, the
Jewish-Christians who authored the Pseudo-Clementine literature did not
feel that their belief in a second heavenly being, who could even be
called ‘god,’ was heretical, since this figure was clearly subordinate.[85]
Subordinationist christology, whether in NT times or later, does not
appear to have been controversial in and of itself.

We may thus suggest that a combination of development and retrospective
condemnation were at work in the origins of the ‘two powers’ controversy.
It seems likely that Gnosticism, while clearly not accepted by most Jews
even in the first century, was condemned as heretical when the rabbis came
to have the power to do so. Belief in a principal divine agent or angelic
mediator was probably not condemned until groups with gnostic tendencies
began to distinguish between the supreme God and the creator of the world,
and/or until Christians began to regard the ‘second power’ as co-equal
with God and equally worthy of worship. The need to polemicize against
such beliefs--which developed out of earlier Jewish beliefs about
mediators, but were not identical to the earlier beliefs--probably
resulted in the condemnation of various streams of thought within Judaism
that were felt to be too similar to the doctrines held by either
Christians or Gnostics. Since they were condemned so late in the game, it
may be that there was some ambiguity about which beliefs were acceptable
and which were not. Perhaps many who would previously have considered
themselves mainstream Jews found their beliefs being censured by the
rabbinic authorities. To what extent such beliefs continued to be held in
spite of official censure, and may have contributed directly to the
beliefs found in later forms of Jewish mysticism, it is impossible to
say.

V.
Conclusion

We
have seen that Segal's work on ‘two powers,’ although widely accepted and
obviously a very important contribution to this field, is not without
shortcomings, and at points the evidence is open to interpretations other
than those argued for by Segal. We have also observed that there is no
passage in the Mishnah or Tosefta which explicitly mentions ‘two powers’
or which requires reference to that heresy in order to be understood.
Alleged connections between ‘two powers’ and early tannaim are also
suspect in view of the late date of the documents which first associate
them with the ‘two powers’ heresy. A plausible setting can be given to the
‘heresy’ and to the controversies it caused in the late second and
subsequent centuries, when the issue of the relationship between God and
creation became an issue of debate for philosophers, Christians and
Gnostics. Therefore, there is good reason to conclude that the
conceptualities later condemned as ‘two powers heresy’ (i.e. those
involving God and a second figure who functions as God's supreme divine
agent) would not have been controversial in the first century. In
short, our study suggests that it is anachronistic to interpret Jewish and
Christian documents from this period as reflecting ‘two powers’
heresy.[86]

[1]The
basic premise of the two powers heresy was “interpreting scripture to say
that a principal angelic or hypostatic manifestation in heaven was
equivalent to God”; Alan Segal, Two Powers in Heaven. Early
Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism (Leiden: Brill,
1977) x.

[2]E.g.,
Mek. R. Ishmael, Bahodesh 5; b. Hag. 15a; 3 Enoch
16.

[3]E.g.,
b. Sanh. 38b, Deut. Rab. 2:33, Eccl. Rab. 4:8; Segal,
Two Powers, 118-20, 139-141, 218.

[4]E.g.,
Mark 14:62; Phil 2:6; Gal 3:20; John 5:18, 6:46, 10:33 ; Rev 19:11-16;
Segal, Two Powers, 205-19.

[5]E.g.,
Som. 1.227-233; Quaest. in Gn. 2.62;  Cher.
27-8; Fug. 95, 101; Segal, Two Powers, 159-181.

[6]E.g.,
John Ashton, Understanding the Fourth Gospel (Oxford: Clarendon,
1991) 158; James D. G. Dunn, The Partings of the Ways (London: SCM,
1991) 228-9; Larry W. Hurtado, One God, One Lord (Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1988) passim; Eric Osborn, The Emergence of Christian
Theology (Cambridge University, 1993) 24-29; John Painter, The
Quest for the Messiah (2nd ed., Nashville: Abingdon, 1993) 225;
Stephen G. Wilson, Related Strangers (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995)
79.

[7]
Segal, Two Powers, x, and Rebecca’s Children (Cambridge:
Harvard University, 1986) 155, 159-60. Nonetheless, Segal recognizes that
the rabbis may not have had sufficient power in the first century to
enforce orthodoxy and censure heresy (Two Powers, 200), though he
does not appear to recognize that some would question whether rabbinic
Judaism was ‘orthodox’ or ‘normative’ at all, or only became such much
later.

[8]
See N. J. McEleney, “Orthodoxy in Judaism of the First Christian Century”,
JSJ 4 (1973), 19-42; idem, “Orthodoxy in Judaism in the
First Christian Century,” JSJ 9 (1978) 83-88; David E. Aune,
“Orthodoxy in First Century Judaism. A Response to N. J. McEleney,”
JSJ 7 (1976) 1-10; L. L. Grabbe, “Orthodoxy in First Century
Judaism. What Are the Issues?”, JSJ 8 (1977), 149-153; Philip S.
Alexander, “‘The Parting of the Ways’ from the Perspective of Rabbinic
Judaism,” in Jews and Christians (ed. James D. G. Dunn; Tübingen:
Mohr-Siebeck, 1992) 2-3, 16, 20-1; Jacob Neusner, Judaic Law from
Jesus to the Mishnah (Atlanta: Scholars, 1993) ch. 1.

[9]Segal
writes, ”It became clear that ‘two powers in heaven’ was a very early
category of heresy, earlier than Jesus, if Philo is a trustworthy witness,
and one of the basic categories by which the rabbis perceived the new
phenomenon of Christianity”; Two Powers, ix; cf. 215.

[10]E.g.,
Segal asserts that Philo’s doctrine of the Logos would “eventually [be]
called heresy”; Two Powers, 173. On anachronism as a form of
apologetic in the Rabbinic literature see Jacob Neusner, Formative
Judaism. Second Series: Religious, Historical, and Literary Studies
(Chico: Scholars, 1983) 167.

[11]E.g.,
Segal muses that “even if the rabbinic evidence alone cannot demonstrate
the existence of a heresy in the first century and before, it may yet give
us hints about the earlier forms of the thought which were in the process
of becoming heretical”; Two Powers, 28 (our italics).

[12]
Recent titles reveal the shift to speaking about ‘Judaisms’. Jacob
Neusner, William S. Green, and Ernest Frerichs (eds.), Judaisms and
Their Messiahs at the Turn of the Christian Era (Cambridge University,
1987); Alan F. Segal, The Other Judaisms of Late Antiquity
(Atlanta: Scholars, 1987).

[13]See
especially Philip S. Alexander, “Rabbinic Judaism and the New Testament,”
ZNW 74 (1983) 237-46; also James D. G. Dunn, The Partings of the
Ways (London: SCM, 1991) 13. Regarding dating see Ithamar Gruenwald,
From Apocalypticism to Gnosticism (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang,
1988) 230; Günter Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and
Midrash (2d ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996) 56-59; Jacob Neusner,
The Rabbinic Traditions about the Pharisees before AD 70 (Leiden:
Brill, 1971), passim.

[14]So
Jacob Neusner, Introduction to Rabbinic Literature (New York:
Doubleday, 1994) 185.

[15]Cf.
Dunn,  Partings, 13.

[16]While
space will not allow a detailed discussion, it must be noted that Philo’s
two dunameis  are not to be simply identified with the two
rsywt of the rabbis. The Greek word dunameis is broader than
the Hebrew term rsywt.  While dunamis can bear the sense of
ruling power (as e.g. in Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris,
Moralia 369 b-e), it does not always have this narrower meaning. In
contrast, ruling power is the basic meaning of the Hebrew
(see further Segal, Two Powers, 7-8 n.8). Philo is clearly
referring to two potencies of the one God (cf. e.g., Philo, Quaest in
Ex. 2.68; Mos. 2.99), and not to a single additional being
placed on the same level as God himself. Philo’s doctrine is close to the
rabbinic concept of God’s two middot. See further Segal, Two
Powers, 174-181. The LXX had no problem with there being a number of
dunameis with Israel’s God as ‘Lord of the powers’ (kurios twn
dunamewn, as e.g. in Ps. 24:10). Likewise, the Qumran doctrine of ‘two
spirits’ is unlikely to have been identified as a doctrine of ‘two ruling
authorities,’ since (however dualistic the idea may seem at times) both
spirits are clearly ultimately subordinate to the one God.

[17]E.g.,
Som. 1.227-229; Quaest in Gn. 2.62; Quaest in Ex.
2.68; Plant. 85-89.

[18]The
tension in Segal’s own analysis of Philo is noteworthy. On the one hand,
Segal writes, “It is impossible to speculate on how the Pharisees would
have reacted to Philo’s system” and yet he also says “that ‘two powers in
heaven’ was a very early category of heresy ... if Philo is a trustworthy
witness”; Two Powers, 261 and x.

[19]Peter
L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality,
New York: Penguin, 1966, 110-146.

[20]Cf.
Dunn, Partings, 205-6; idem, “How Controversial was Paul’s
Christology?” From Jesus to John (ed. M. C. de Boer; Sheffield
Academic, 1993) 162-166; idem, The Theology of Paul the
Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 252-260, 293; Donald A. Hagner,
“Paul’s Christology and Jewish Monotheism” Perspectives on
Christology  (ed. Marguerite Shuster and Richard Muller; Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991) 28-30. Segal’s reading of Gal. 3:19-20 is highly
problematic (Two Powers, 210-11). It does not concern mediator
figures diluting monotheism. Rather, Gal 3:19-20 concerns whether or
not  Moses can represent the one people of God which unites Jews and
Gentiles and thus corresponds to the one God. For this exegesis see N. T.
Wright, The Climax of the Covenant (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1991), 159-162. The other Pauline passages cited by Segal (Phil 2:6 and
Eph 1:21) use language reminiscent of the later ‘two powers’ material, but
without any indication that it is controversial.

[21]For
examples of inner-Jewish polemic in early Judaism see Luke T. Johnson,
“The New Testament’s Anti-Jewish Slander and the Conventions of Ancient
Polemic,” JBL 108 (1989) 436-441.

[22]Frances
Young notes the lack of awareness of a 'christological problem' on the
part of the NT authors in “Christology and Creation: Towards a Hermeneutic
of Patristic Christology” (in T. Merrigan and J. Haers (eds.) The myriad
Christ: plurality and the quest for unity in contemporary christology
(BETL 152), Leuven: Peeters, 2000, pp.191-205. The authors are grateful to
Prof. Young for allowing them to see a copy of her paper prior to its
publication). See also Dunn, Partings, 205-6.

[23]Segal,
Two Powers, 262.

[24]That
the Johannine Christians were accused of abandoning monotheism appears to
be the consensus of recent scholarship. See J. L. Martyn, History and
Theology in the Fourth Gospel (2d ed., Nashville: Abingdon, 1979), 72;
John Ashton, Understanding, 144-146; Robin Scroggs, Christology
in Paul and John (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988) 78-79;Dunn,
Partings, 228-9; idem, “Let John be John: A Gospel for Its
Time,” The Gospel and the Gospels (ed. Peter Stuhlmacher; Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991) 316; Wilson, Related, 189-90; Maurice
Casey, Is John’s Gospel True? (London: Routledge, 1996) 3,
30-1.

[25]On
agency and the Johannine Jesus see further Peder Borgen, “God’s Agent in
the Fourth Gospel,” The Interpretation of John  (ed. John
Ashton; London: SPCK, 1986) 67-78; A. E. Harvey, “Christ as Agent” The
Glory of Christ in the New Testament (ed. L. D. Hurst and N. T.
Wright; Oxford: Clarendon, 1987) 239-250; also Jan-A. Bühner, Der
Gesandte und sein Weg im 4. Evangelium (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1977),
passim.

[26]Concordance
to the Novum Testamentum Graece(3rd ed., Berlin: Walter De Gruyter,
1987). On the sending motif see further the recent book by Andreas J.
Köstenberger, The Missions of Jesus and the Disciples According to the
Fourth Gospel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 97-111.

[27]On
the concept of agency in the ancient world see especially Borgen, “God’s
Agent,” passim.

[28]
The issue in John is thus not equality with God per se, but whether
Jesus is “making himself God” (John 10:33) or “making
himself equal to God” (John 5:18). John denies that Jesus “makes
himself anything” (John 5:19; 8:28). See C. K. Barrett, “'The Father is
Greater than I' (John 14:28). Subordinationist Christology in the New
Testament,” Essays on John (London: SPCK, 1982) 24; Raymond E.
Brown, The Community of the Beloved Disciple (Mahwah: Paulist,
1979) 47 n.80; Wayne A. Meeks, “Equal to God” in The Conversation
Continues (ed. Robert T. Fortna and Beverly R. Gaventa; Nashville:
Abingdon, 1990) 309-21; Jerome H. Neyrey, “‘My Lord and My God’: The
Divinity of Jesus in John's Gospel,” SBL Seminar Paper Series, 25
(Atlanta: Scholars, 1986) 155-159. This point has been discussed and
argued more fully in part two of James McGrath, John’s Apologetic
Christology (SNTSMS, 111), Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[29]On
first-century monotheism see especially Larry W. Hurtado, “What Do We Mean
by ‘First-Century Jewish Monotheism’,” SBL 1993 Seminar Papers,
(ed. David Lull; Atlanta: Scholars, 1993) 348-368; see also Peter Hayman,
“Monotheism - A Misused Word in Jewish Studies?" JJS 42 (1991)
2-15; Loren T. Stuckenbruck, Angel Veneration and Christology
(Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1995) 15-21; Alexander, “Parting,” 19-20.

[30]Cf.
C. H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge
University, 1953) 276-7; Wayne A. Meeks, “The Divine Agent and His
Counterfeit in Philo and the Fourth Gospel” Aspects of Religious
Propaganda in Judaism and Early Christianity (ed. Elisabeth Schüssler
Fiorenza; University of Notre Dame, 1976) 43-67; Craig A. Evans, Word
and Glory (Sheffield Academic, 1993) 100-12.

[31]Compare,
for example, Philo, Quaest in Gn. 2.62 with Dec. 65.
Although Segal is a bit ambiguous, he seems to accept that Philo had no
intention of compromising monotheism (Two Powers, 161, 166-8). See
also Hurtado, One God, 41-48; Dunn, Christology, 227-8.

[32]The
Johannine use of ‘the name’ and ‘I am’ can be interpreted as a claim that
he bears the name of God (John 17:11) in a way that is similar to the
angel Yahoel in Apoc. Abr. 10:3, 8. See Ashton,
Understanding, 143-4.

[33]The
phrase is used by Dunn, Partings, 228.

[34]Henry
Chadwick, The Early Church (London: Penguin, 1993) 75.

[35]Dial.
56.

[36]Dial.
60.

[37]Segal,
Other Judaisms, 17.

[38]Cf.
Alexander, “Parting,” 3, 16, 20-1. We do not deny that the majority (if
not all) who identified themselves as ‘Jewish’ in the first century held
to belief in one God; rather, we deny that such belief was incompatible
with belief in a supreme angelic or heavenly agent. See also Dunn,
Partings, 12-3, and for a helpful alternative to monolithic
classifications of religions see Jonathan Z. Smith, “Fences and Neighbors:
Some Contours of Early Judaism,” Approaches to Ancient Judaism. Volume
II (ed. William Scott Green; Chico: Scholars, 1980) 1-25.

[39]E.g.,
t. Hul. 2.24; cf. Jack T. Sanders, Schismatics, Sectarians,
Dissidents, Deviants (London: SCM, 1993) 61-7. Minim included,
but was not limited to, Jewish-Christians; cf. Reuven Kimelman, “Birkat
ha-Minim and the Lack of Evidence for an Anti-Christian Jewish Prayer
in Late Antiquity,” Jewish and Christian Self-Definition, Vol. 2
(ed. E. P. Sanders, et. al.; London: SCM, 1981) 228-232.

[40]While
not settling the issue, it is worth noting that later rabbinic writings
appear to distinguish between those who believe there is ‘no power’ in
heaven (presumably atheists or Epicureans), those who believe in ‘many
powers,’ and those who believe in ‘two powers’. Cf. e.g. Sifre
Deut. 329, and Segal, Two Powers, 8-9.

[41]Dial.
62. Those who formulated such views may have been seeking to reconcile or
harmonize Jewish beliefs with those of non-Jews, or to distance the
highest God from creating directly in accordance with contemporary
philosophy. Cf. Philo, Fug. 68-70; Conf. 179-182; Op.
72-72, and also the discussions in Jarl Fossum, The Name of God and the
Angel of the Lord (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1985) 197-204; Birger A.
Pearson, Gnosticism, Judaism and Egyptian Christianity
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990) 34-38.

[42]Cf.
the texts conveniently collected in Fossum, Name, 213-220. See also
Philo, Fug. 69, who nonetheless elsewhere emphasizes that God alone
is the creator (cf. e.g. Cher. 77).

[43]This
type of exegetical argument is also found in the later Targumic
traditions, which draw parallels between the uniqueness of Adam and the
uniqueness of God. The references to God are in the plural and explain
them in terms of God speaking to the angels or to his Memra. See
especially Tg. Neof. to Gen. 1:26-27; 3:22. The fact that Targum
Onqelos, which is probably the earliest existing targum to the
Pentateuch, mentions Adam’s uniqueness but does not emphasize the
uniqueness of God, may suggest that the plurals in the creation stories
were not the focus of intense controversy until after the interpretative
traditions preserved in Onqelos had already taken shape.

[44]See
Josephus, Contra Ap. 2.193 and N. T. Wright’s discussion of
“covenental monotheism” in The New Testament and the People of God
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992) 251-2.

[45]Interestingly,
Vermes reached the same conclusion about the identity on the minim
when looking at another strand of tradition. Cf. Geza Vermes, “The
Decalogue and the Minim” Post-Biblical Jewish Studies (Leiden:
Brill, 1975) 176-7.

[46]Cf.
Neusner, Formative Judaism: Religious, Historical, and Literary
Studies. Fifth Series (Chico: Scholars, 1985) 15-6, who suggests that
the rabbis who composed the Mishnah were concerned, if not with
Gnosticism, then at least with the same issues that concerned the
Gnostics. Yet caution must be exercised in view of the lack of clear
evidence, as Gruenwald notes, Apocalypticism, 242-251. See also
Nathaniel Deutsch, The Gnostic Imagination (Leiden: Brill, 1995),
esp. 36-47.

[47]Cf.
Segal, Two Powers, 99.

[48]
Cf. y. Ber. 12d-13a; b. Sanh. 38b; see also
Tanhuma Kadoshim 4.

[49]Segal,
Two Powers, 100, 152.

[50]Two
Powers, 101.

[51]Gruenwald,
Apocalypticism, 249-50.

[52]The
issue here could possibly be the same as that mentioned in connection with
the first text we discussed, namely that someone other than God was
responsible for part of creation, thus resulting in an inferior material
world. However, the specific association with Adam has little connection
with such ideas. The Gnostics did believe in a God named anthrwpos
(‘man’), but this was the highest God rather than the inferior
creator. The rabbinic polemic against ‘man’ creating would most likely
have fueled Gnostic exegesis rather than countering it.  Cf. Elaine
Pagels, The Gnostic Gospels (London: Penguin, 1979) 132; also
Irenaeus, Adv. Haer., 1.12.3; 1.30.6. At any rate, the use of the
term ‘partner’ implies a co-operating rather than an opposing power.

[53]Like
t. Sanh. 8:7, Philo himself asserts that God had no need of a
helper when he created (Op., 23,46). Also see Hans-Friedrich Weiss,
Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des Hellenistischen und Palästinischen
Judentums (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966) 320-1.

[54]Segal,
Two Powers, 49. It is interesting to note that the association of
different names of God with the two divine attributes of 'justice' and
'mercy' is what Philo refers to as God's "two powers". This tradition, in
a slightly different form and using different terminology, is also well
attested in the Rabbinic corpus.

[55]The
idea of a figure other than God sitting in heaven is a point of
controversy in later writings, and this may in fact have been
objectionable to some even at an early stage (cf. Gruenwald,
Apocalypticism, 238; Darrell L. Bock, “The Son of Man Seated at
God’s Right Hand and the Debate over Jesus’ “Blasphemy”,” Jesus of
Nazareth: Lord and Christ (ed. Joel B. Green and Max Turner; Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994) 189-90). Yet what is striking is that in the
viewpoint attributed to Akiba, and in 3 Enoch, human figures are described
as sitting in heaven, and it is only in later additions that such ideas
are counterbalanced in an attempt to make them seem more ‘orthodox.’

[56]So
Dunn, Partings, 174-5. See also Wright, New Testament and the
People of God, 259, on Jewish monotheism in this period.

[57]This
also appears to be a key issue in the disagreement between Justin and
Trypho in Dial. 38. What is blasphemous is not what Christians
claim per se, but the fact that they make such claims for a
crucified man. See further also Darrell L. Bock, Blasphemy and
Exaltation in Judaism, Grand Rapids, Baker, 2000, 208-9.

[58]This
tradition is also relatively late, but there is nonetheless good reason
for the early rabbis to have avoided mentioning it (embarrassment at the
mistaken claims of a great rabbi and fear of reprisals from Rome may have
been among their motives), and no real reason why it should have been
invented.

[59]‘Blasphemy’
need not imply some sort of challenge to monotheism; cf. Bock, “Son of
Man,” 184-186.

[60]There
does not seem to have been an opposition by the rabbis to messianic
expectation per se in the period between the Jewish revolts. In
fact, Joseph Klausner (The Messianic Idea in Israel, London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1956, 392-396) notes that messianic and nationalistic
fervour actually increased during this period. The problem in the
case of the Christians was probably that, during this period of hope for a
restored nation and temple, they claimed that a man who had threatened the
temple and been killed by the Romans was the Messiah.

[61]Segal,
Two Powers, 60. We presume that Segal means it was added in the
latest stage of the redaction of Bavli, rather than being a much later
interpolation. There are good form critical reasons for this conclusion,
as shown by David J. Halperin, The Merkabah in Rabbinic Literature
(New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1980) 76, 92; see also Christopher
Rowland, The Open Heaven (London: SPCK, 1982) 309-312. On the
generally unreliable character of the baraitot which are found in
Bavli, see Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash,
198-9.

[62]P.
Alexander, “3 (Hebrew Apocalypse of) Enoch,” The Old Testament
Pseudepigrapha. Vol.1 (ed. James H. Charlesworth; New York: Doubleday,
1983) 226.

[63]Alexander,
“3 Enoch,” 226-229.

[64]Alexander,
“3 Enoch,” 268; idem, “The Historical Setting of the Hebrew Book of
Enoch,” JJS 28 (1977) 178. See also Gruenwald,
Apocalypticism, 229-30, who notes that the explanation given for
Aher’s apostasy in b. Hag. 15a is not the earliest one; cf.
t. Hag. 2.3-4; y. Hag. 77b; Cant. R.
1.4; I. Gruenwald, Apocalyptic and Merkabah Mysticism (Leiden:
Brill, 1980) 90; John Bowker, The Targums and Rabbinic Literature
(Cambridge University, 1969) 149; Fossum, Name, 309 accepts the
Bavli account over the earlier ones found in the Tosefta and Yerushalmi
for no apparent reason other than he is already convinced of the early
date of the ‘two powers’ material. Rowland’s suggestion (Open
Heaven, 334) that Yerushalmi knew the story about Aher and Metatron
but chose to suppress it is highly speculative (the citation of Eccl 5:5-6
is more likely to be the inspiration for the later traditions, rather than
evidence that the Metatron story was known earlier and suppressed).

[65]Gruenwald,
Apocalypticism, 242. There is some evidence which suggests that the
‘heresy’ of Aher was Gnosticism; see Pearson, Gnosticism, 24;
Deutsch, Gnostic, 46-7, 55. However, L. Ginzberg, “Elisha ben
Abuyah,” JE 5, 138-9, notes the unreliable character of the later
Aher stories, and suggests that Elisha was in fact a rabbi who became a
Sadducee (i.e., he was an apostate from Pharisaism but not from Judaism)
and only later had extreme heretical views attributed to him. See also
Rowland, Open Heaven, 337-8, and the forthcoming book by Alon
Goshen-Gottstein, The Sinner and the Amnesiac: The Rabbinic Invention
of Elisha Ben Abuya and Eleazar Ben Arach, Stanford University Press,
2001.

[66]Rightly
George F. Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian
Era, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1927) 365-6. On dating
Sifre, see Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash,
272-3.

[67]Segal,
Two Powers, 17.

[68]Regarding
Sifre Deut 379, Segal argues that the identity of the heretical
group is “elusive” and that the passage could have several groups in mind.
While this seems true in characterizing the passage as a whole, it is also
obvious that an antagonistic form of ‘two powers’ is particularly in view.
See Segal, Two Powers, 85.

[69]As
is noted by Segal, Two Powers, 57. On dating Mekhilta, see
Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 253-255.

[70]See
the relevant passages reproduced in Pearson, Gnosticism, 30-1;
Pagels, Gnostic Gospels, 55-6; Segal, Other Judaisms,
27.

[71]Segal,
Two Powers, 262. This is not to say that Gnosticism (belief in two
opposing powers) is older than other ‘two power’ traditions (which
maintain belief in two complementary powers). Rather, it to say that
resistance to Gnosticism is found in the rabbinic literature before
resistance to other two power traditions emerged. The term ‘two
powers,’ therefore, was probably first used as a reference to Gnostics,
and only subsequently to Christians and others with beliefs similar to
theirs.

[72]Cf.
R. McL. Wilson, The Gnostic Problem (London: Mowbray, 1958) 261 and
passim; Pearson, Gnosticism, 34-36,171-182, for a balanced
assessment of a number of the similarities and differences between Philo
and the Gnostics.

[73]Cf.
Neusner, Formative Judaism: Fifth Series, 15-17.

[74]Cf.
especially Pearson, Gnosticism, passim; idem, “The
Problem of “Jewish Gnostic” Literature” Nag Hammadi, Gnosticism, and
Early Christianity (ed. Charles W. Hedrick and Robert Hodgson;
Peabody: Hendrickson, 1986) 21-35. See also Segal, Other Judaisms,
32-34.

[75]Cf.
Gerhard May, Creatio ex Nihilo (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994).
See also Origen, De Prin. 2.1.4; Tertullian, Adv. Herm.
2-3.

[76]So
May, Creatio, 25; Hayman, “Monotheism,” 3-4.

[77]Quis.
Her., 206. See further Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian
Mystical Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981) 75-77.

[78]See
further Louth, Origins, 75-77; Young, “Christology”; Rowan
Williams, Arius. Heresy and Tradition (London: Darton, Longman and
Todd, 1987).

[79]On
worship rather than cosmology as the distinguishing feature between the
Jewish worldview and that of others see especially Hurtado, “What Do We
Mean,” 349,355-365. Cf. also Alexander, “Historical,” 179. However, we
would exmphasize that is was sacrificial cultic worship, rather than
worship in any broader sense, that was the make-or-break issue and
dividing line.

[80]E.g.
Hurtado, One God, 75; P. S. Alexander, “Parting,” 19-20; John J.
Collins, “Jewish Monotheism and Christian Theology”, in Aspects of
Monotheism (ed. Hershel Shanks and Jack Meinhardt; Washington:
Biblical Archaeology Society, 1997) 81-105.

[81]b.
Sanh. 38b.

[82]Segal
notes that it is not belief in Metatron per se that is the issue
(Two Powers, 65). Gruenwald, Apocalypticism, 248 does
insufficient justice to the apparent acceptability of belief in Metatron
among the rabbis.

[83]Cf.
the letter of Pliny to Trajan (Ep. 10.96.7). On the evidence of
worship offered to Christ in the NT see the different opinions in Hurtado,
One God, 99-124; Richard Bauckham, “Jesus, Worship of” ABD
vol.3 (ed. D. N. Freedman; New York: Doubleday, 1992) 812-816; Hagner,
“Paul’s Christology,” 26; Dunn, Partings, 204-206. See also 3 Enoch
14:5-16:5, where the apostasy of Aher is almost immediately preceded by
the heavenly homage offered to Metatron. On development of the worship of
Christ in the second century cf. Jonathan Knight, Disciples of the
Beloved One (Sheffield Academic, 1996), 71-153.

[84]Moore
(Judaism, 365) notes the resemblance between the arguments used in
debates between Rabbinic Judaism and Catholic Christianity and those found
in the ‘Two Powers’ material. The tendency for Christians to distinguish
their Trinitarian belief in God from Jewish monotheism can be traced back
to the early third century: cf. e.g. Tertullian, Adv. Prax.
31.1-2.

[85]The
issue between the author of the Pseudo-Clementines and ‘the Jews’ was
apparently whether Jesus is the Messiah, not the idea of being a
pre-existent, subordinate heavenly viceroy. See further Segal, Two
Powers, 256-258; James McGrath, “Johannine Christianity -
Jewish Christianity?” Koinonia VIII.1 (1996) 6-7.

[86]The
authors thank Dr. Robert Hayward for his helpful comments on an earlier
version of this paper.